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Militarization of Japan’s Space Program: 
Basic Plan 2016
On April 1, 2016, almost eight years after 
the Space Basic Law (Basic Law) was passed, 
allowing Japan to use outer space for military 
purposes and placing the Prime Minister’s 
Cabinet Office (CO) in control of policy, the 
CO’s Office of National Space Policy (ONSP) 
released its Space Basic Plan 2016 (hereafter, 
Basic Plan 2016), Japan’s first fully-timetabled 
and funded national military space policy.1 
Basic Plan 2016 framed Japan’s space program 
as an essential component of the security 
doctrine of the second Abe administration. It 
explicitly provided a framework for the ongoing 
operational integration of space technologies in 
the service of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, 
reflecting the goals of Japan’s first National 
Security Strategy (NSS) published by the 
National Security Council (NSC) established in 
2013 that sought to recognize outer space as a 
strategic domain.2
Basic Plan 2016 embedded an ongoing 
multifaceted militarization of Japanese space 
technologies in the defense of Japan, setting in 
motion and/or deciding that Japan would: double 
its constellation of Information Gathering 
Satellite (IGS) reconnaissance (spy) satellites, 
used to monitor Chinese and North Korean 
military activities, North Korean missile bases, 
its Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, and other 
areas of concern; develop a space-based 
component for maritime surveillance to play a 
role in a joint Japanese-U.S. Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) capability to surveil Chinese 
and North Korean maritime activities; deputize 
Japan’s centimeter-level-accuracy regional 
version of the U.S. Global Positioning System 
(GPS), the seven satellite Quasi-Zenith Satellite 
System (QZSS), which can be used to provide 
precision strike for Japanese smart munitions 
(bombs, missiles, and now hypersonic missiles), 
as a fallback for the GPS system, and; improve 
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities 
in tandem with the Japanese Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) and the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces (JSDF), particularly the Air-Self Defense 
Force (ASDF), to support U.S. monitoring of 
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons development by 
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).3
As seen with the militarization of Japan’s 
SSA capabilities, Basic Plan 2016 also mandated 
the direct involvement of the MOD and JSDF 
service branches with Japan’s traditional 
civilian space development bodies, resulting in 
increasingly deep integration (jointedness) of 
the JSDF and its military goals with those of 
formerly civilian agencies. For example, to 
counter trans-Pacific medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBMs) and ICBMs, the JSDF is 
joint developing a space-based Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) Early Warning (EW) sensor for 
a dual-use Earth reconnaissance satellite being 
built by the Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA).4 In May 2020, the ASDF (which 
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itself, reflecting the increased strategic military 
importance of space, is to be renamed the 
Japan Aerospace Self-Defense Force in 2021), 
established its own Space Operations Squadron 
(宇宙作戦隊) working closely with JAXA on SSA.5 
JAXA itself, formerly solely under the direction 
of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (MEXT), is pushing 
ahead with a ser ies of “dual-use” space 
programs, including the maneuverable SLATS 
(Super Low Altitude Test Satellite, subsequently 
named Tsubame) tactical spy satellites that can 
steer themselves and lower their orbits to 
capture higher resolution data.6
Rearming by stealth? Problems with mac-
roanalytical interpretations
Japan’s commitment to delivering new 
strategic space capabilities and the militariza-
tion of space is made possible by the dual-use 
justification of the space budget allowing for 
the channeling of funds into “dual-use” (i.e. 
military-use) technologies, even if these are not 
officially counted as part of the defense budget. 
The ostensibly civilian “dual-use” (i.e. also mili-
tary use or, like with SLATS above, specifically 
designed for later military exploitation) portion 
of Japan’s space development budget actually 
accounts for between 35-40 percent of the cur-
rent approx. ¥350 billion annual budget.7
Basic Plan 2016 represented, in fact, the 
fruition of a series of reconsiderations since 
1998, and the overflight of Japan of a North 
Korean Taepodong missile, about how, and how 
much Japan should formally militarize its 
space program. Until 2008, uniquely in the 
world, Japanese space policy was wedded to a 
1969 Peaceful Purposes Resolution (PPR) 
passed by the Japanese Diet. From 1969 until 
2008, the PPR articulated an unequivocal com-
mitment to “peaceful only” development, far 
more restrictive than the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty (OST), which generally allows for the 
“nonaggressive” use of military technologies.8 
This PPR framework was overturned by the 
passing of the Basic Law in 2008, which pro-
vided Japan with a legal basis to pursue the 
use of military space, and gave the CO under 
the Prime Minister more control in policy-
making.9
Analytical issues
Certainly compared to the extreme paci-
fism inherent in the PPR, present policy and 
programs can be characterized as qualitatively 
and quantitatively different from even a few 
years ago. But how may we interpret this? A 
neorealist approach will find plenty of evidence 
that Japan is rearming, or using space tech-
nologies to balance the PRC and North Korea. 
For some scholars, including the author, writ-
ing from a neorealist perspective, under the re-
visionist policies of the Abe government, the 
militarization of Japanese space policy, acceler-
ated under the second Abe administration, rep-
resents a deep slash in a decades’ long process 
of salami-slicing away prior constraints of the 
Yoshida Doctrine.10
Neoliberal and constructivist approaches 
emphasise steps Japan hasn’t taken, but could 
have, to rearm, such as more explicitly testing 
even more advanced military technologies, or 
ignoring this, focus on Japanese restraint in 
the face of an increasing complexity of regional 
security issues. Constructivist-based analyses 
argue for the essential continuities of security 
policy to demonstrate how Japan’s stable, deep-
rooted and embedded domestic politics and 
norms of anti-militarism continue to trump any 
international structural pressures. Such ap-
proaches emphasise that today’s space policy is 
still moderate, in line with previous national 
and bilateral strategic postures; that the 
changes that have taken place have remained 
tempered by, and are the product of past do-
mestic political and international constraints. 
There is also plenty of evidence in support of 
neoliberal and constructivist-type analyses, 
showing that Japan is maintaining a cautious, 
gradualist approach in adapting its security 
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strategy to meet the uncertainties of a multipo-
lar world.11
For example, “Japan’s Legislation for Peace 
and Security” of September 2015 faced lengthy 
opposition scrutiny, forcing the Abe Cabinet to 
extend the Diet session by 95 days, making it 
the longest in the post-war era, and in the face 
of widespread public opposition.12 In space poli-
cy transition/transformation in particular, it 
can be noted that it took twenty five years of 
false starts, failures, and bureaucratic battles, 
despite strong pressures from industry, and 
then from within the government itself, to fund 
the QZSS program, which was openly acknowl-
edged as a strategic “must have” in the mid-
1990s.13 Specifically, for example, Basic Plan 
2016 was actually the fourth attempt at enact-
ing the Basic Law. Basic Plan 1 (2009) and Ba-
sic Plan 2 (2013), both failed because the CO 
failed to exert control over Japan’s space pro-
gram as several ministries remained at odds 
with each other.14
In fact, Basic Plan 2016 and its predecessor 
Basic Plan 3 turned out to be far less ambitious 
than a much more radical proposal by very se-
nior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) national 
security policy leadership, elements of the bu-
reaucracy, and senior JMOD leaders, who en-
visaged a much faster and deeper militariza-
tion of space policy programs and institutions, 
for example placing a Space Agency (Uchūchō) 
under direct control of the CO and transform-
ing JAXA to a Japanese equivalent of the De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) focused on developing military and 
national security programs above all other pri-
orities.15
Indeed, mainstream international rela-
tions scholars who are unfamiliar with the im-
pact of new technologies on military and secu-
rity doctrine, perhaps because they are wary of 
path dependency and technological determin-
ism issues, often categorize Japan’s transfor-
mation of its space policy in terms of “paramili-
tarization” or securitization of Japan’s space 
program, perhaps also because the vast major-
ity of the dual-use programs remain under the 
control of MEXT, a ministry that until very re-
cently was avowedly culturally, institutionally 
and legally expressly against promoting any 
military use of space. 
Thus, to date, most mainstream academic 
scholarship on Japanese space policy, such as it 
is, has focused on the meaning of the 2008 Ba-
sic Law, characterizing it as part of a gradual-
ist approach to Japan evolving its security 
strategy constrained by political, bureaucratic, 
legal, constitutional and budgetary norms.16
With all this in mind, it becomes clear that 
that Table 1 below can easily be used for a 
structural/neorealist analysis of the transition 
of Japanese space policy to demonstrate a clear 
and action-reaction (threat-response) narrative 
supporting the timing and contents of Japan’s 
militarization of its space program, particular-
ly linking security concerns and U.S. interven-
tions, with space policy being part of an inter-
nal or external balancing strategy. Conversely, 
for neoliberal, internationalist, or constructiv-
ist approaches, Table 1 can also be used to 
demonstrate the webs of complex and dense 
structural international and domestic interde-
pendencies, norms and structures that modu-
late policy change in Japan.
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Policy Basic Law Basic Plan 1 Basic Plan 2 LDP Strategy Mid-Term Plan Basic Plan 3
Purpose Foundational Implement Basic 
Law
Revise Basic 
Plan 1 following 













of NSS reflecting 
LDP Strategy
Date August 2008 June 2009 January 2013 August 2014 August 2014 January 2015
Details Main Objectives.
1. End PPR and 
normalize 
military space 
use in the OST. 
2. Make a Basic 
Plan within one 




3. Review JAXA 
role in one year. 
4. Establish a 
new policy & 
administrative 
executive to 
effect Basic Plan 
& override 
MEXT. 
5. Draft a Space 
Activities Act in 
two  years.  
6. Increase 
budget from 
¥300B to ¥500B. 
7. Employ space 
development as a 
strategic policy 





targets for five 
satellite sys-







1. Space science. 
2. Human space 
activities





budget to ¥500B 
by 2013. Focus 
specifically on 
QZSS and on 




1. A regional 
QZSS system. 









4. More flexible 
space access. 
5 Downgrade 




space flight.  
6. Improve SSA, 
MDA and unify 
all Earth obser-
vation data into 
one infrastruc-
ture. 






space policy with 
NSS & create 
NSSS
2. Integrate 








budget by up to 
¥200B/ year (to 
¥500B) for 
military space.
5. Double IGS 
constellation.
6. create MDA 
constellation.
7. Deploy space-
based EW & 
ELINT satellites.
8. Create  space 
infrastructure at 
the service of 
MOD.
9. Evolve JAXA 
to take a DAR-
PA-type role.








with the U.S. & 
ASEAN
3. Create a 




1. Seven satellite 
QZSS
2. Enhance IGS,
3. Develop new 
data relay & 










sats. 10. Finish 
Space Activities 
Act.







openly stated as 
destabilizing 
factor. 
3. QZSS, IGS 
funded to 2025; 
IGS to be 
bolstered
3. Military dual 
use optical data 
relay sats 
funded. 4. Needs 
for SSA and 
MDA to be 
worked out in 
two-year studies. 
5. QZSS desig-
nated as GPS 
backup. 6. JAXA 
works closely 
with MOD ALOS 
to host MOD EW 
sensor
6. JAXA dual-
use tacsats and 
SLATs funded.  





About to be 
implemented 
with strong 
military focus as 
a result of Basic 
Plan 3. Uchūchō 













cy moves on 
autopilot until 
Basic Plan 2.
CO takes partial 
control via QZSS 
but fails to 
tackle infight-
ing; loses cred-
ibility over MDA 
failure. METI 
withdraws; 











with NSS with 
MOD and 
dual-use actors. 
Decision on an 
Uchūchō 
shelved.
To result in 
Basic Plan 3, but 
talk of an 
Uchūchō quietly 
shelved. Depth of 
subordination of 
space policy to 
NSS within NSC 



















Table 1: List of Comparative Dimensions of Key Policy Benchmarks
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U.S. 
Position
2+2 June 2011 1st Comprehen-
sive Dialogue on 
Space
2+2 Oct. 2013 2nd Comprehen-




























Block IIA, 2nd 
AN/TPY-2 radar: 
SSA, MDA, coop-
erate on an 
International 
Code of Conduct 
for Outer Space 
Activities; 
establish bilat-
eral Defense ISR 
Working Group.
May 2014:  
Japan’s space 
assets indispens-
able for U.S. 
Japan security; 
provision of SSA 
data from JAXA 


























Nov. 2006:  
Established 
Council on the 
Strengthening of 





rity.  Feb. 2007, 
proposed estab-
lishment of the 
NSC; abandoned 






ment of the Advi-
sory Panel on 
Reconstruction 




consider rights of 
CSD.










allowed under 4 
scenarios, 
including to 
protect a U.S. 
naval vessel in 
seas near Japan 
and shooting 






(Dec. 2010): To 
provide continu-
ous steady-state 
ISR activities of 
the land, sea and 
















and NSS; called 
for integration of 
space policy into 
the NSS; NDPG. 













tion; seek more 
extensive 
cooperation and 




Article 9 of the 
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defense of U.S. 
naval assets, etc. 










tary space:  
IGS & BMD














of PPR by 
Nakasone 
Cabinet 1985) 
but full use of 
IGS and other 
EO data; deploy-
ment of two-tier 
BMD. Basic Law 
causes MOD to 
launch an 
investigation 
into its needs. 
Response to 
Basic Law: 


































SSA and MDA. 
Increased 
participation at 










activity on space 
based applica-
tions.  Closer ties 
to JAXA and 
METI. 
Response to MDA 
failure, U.S. 




prove ISR, boost 
IGS, integrate 
dual-use EO with 








BMD EW R&D 
with JAXA, SSA.
Institutional Realities
One of the critical policy and administra-
tive goals of the Basic Law of 2008 was to sim-
plify policy-making, take it out of control of 
MEXT, and into the CO.17 What actually hap-
pened, as illustrated in Figure 1, shows policy-
making is actually the evolved product of sets 
of legal and constitutional limitations, policy 
norms, and administrative structures as much 
as structural pressures. Clearly, understand-
ing space policy making requires a multi-
stakeholder and multi-level approach. Figure 2 
presents a much broader picture of who is actu-
ally involved, encompassing all the convention-
al levels of analysis from the structural down 
through to the bureaucratic layer, and …“lower.”
Figure 1 acknowledges the complexity and 
internal balancing required to formulate Ja-
pan’s post-Basic Law space policy and adminis-
trative reform, showing the structure that was 
implemented in 2012 after the Basic Law, 
which sought to set up CO control, or at least 
coordination of policymaking, as encompassed 
in the establishment of the ONSP. Figure 1 also 
shows how the ONSP coordinates a range of 
implementing bureaucratic institutions, with 
policymaking guidance controlled through the 
Space Policy Commission (SPC). While the po-
sition of the ONSP, situated within the CO, 
shows the connection it has with political pow-
er (in fact in 2012 the Prime Minister took a 
dual role as a competent minister for JAXA ex-
plain JAXA in terms of space policy), Figure 1 
also shows the potential of tangled lines of pur-
pose, in that JAXA has three ministers over-
seeing it. 
Problems with microanalytical interpreta-
tions
As noted, Figure 1 provides fertile re-
search ground not only for constructivists and 
neoliberal internationalists but also bureau-
cratic institutionalist-based based approaches. 
When looking at the bureaucratic-political in-
teractions that appear in space policy change, 
the power, position, motivation, and behavior of 
the bureaucracy is nothing less than critical. 
Indeed, reflecting its central role in Japanese 
policy, the study of the central bureaucracy 
and, for example, tatewari-gyōsei has been a 
major plank in researching and understanding 
Japanese decision-making in political society 
for the last thirty or forty years.18 But then, bu-
reaucratic institutionalism-based approaches 
Sources: Author’s own research
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ignore international structural levels of analy-
sis. Japan’s militarization of its space program 
is certainly also the result of or a reaction to 
international security instability. Also, institu-
tionalist and neoinstiutionalist-based analyses 
are usually used to explain stasis or why 
things don’t change.19 Yet change there has 
been, and plenty of it.
From multi-layered and interconnected…
to the SAF framework
Various frameworks have emerged over the 
last twenty years to deal with international re-
lations issues that interact with complex do-
mestic structures, including forms of game 
theory, analytical eclecticism, and hybrid ap-
proaches.20 The approach of this analysis is dif-
ferent. The essential argument of this paper, 
then, is that it is analytically unhelpful to try 
to make sense of the transition of Japanese 
space policy without taking into account the 
influence of decisions of actors and stakehold-
ers taken at six, seven, or even at eight levels. 
But how to account for these systematically 
and in a logical framework? To account for all 
the actors involved, Figure 2 might be proposed 
to account for all the “actors” involved in pro-
moting, influencing, blocking, absorbing, pars-
ing, and manipulating, etc., Japanese space 
policy. Critically, Figure 2 demonstrates two 
main axes of interaction. The first is a vertical 
hierarchy of layers. Arguably, the top-down 
structure, replicating a traditional decision-
making process, also represents power rela-
tionships as well. The second is significant 
“horizontal” interactions. So interactions are 
interdependent, interconnected, and multi-di-
mensional. The purpose of this paper is to 
make sense of these relationships in a workable 
logical framework called the Strategic Action 
Field (SAF) framework (the SAF framework). 
First published in 2011 as the Theory of Fields, 
the SAF framework was designed specifically 
to model groups of stakeholders involved in dy-
namic changes over time. This approach was 
also specifically developed to create an analyti-
cal framework to deal with those groups in the 
context of interdependent linkages.21
In this way, the SAF framework accounts 
for the dynamic interplay of actors modulated 
through matrices of players in groupings called 
Strategic Action Fields (SAFs), in which the ac-
tions of one field or the players in it may affect 
Figure 1: Japan’s Administrative and Intuitional Framework for Space Policy in 2012
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others, but do so coherently, in logically ex-
plainable (framework) and explained (analysis) 
and rational patterns of behavior, change, and 
outcomes (or lack of them). The SAF framework 
places players, motives, behaviors and actions 
into interdependently linked fields of action 
that have their own dynamics, but whose be-
havior is bidirectionally interlinked and made 
logical and understandable according to cer-
tain rules governing position and behavior.22
The SAF approach thus creates an analyti-
cal framework that accounts for the internal 
logic of all the decision layers and their inter-
connections by putting the players (or actors/
competitors) into SAFs in which internal and 
external behavioral dynamics can be under-
stood through simple sets of rules.
The premise and the rules
To account for dynamism in change (in our 
case the evolution from Basic Plans 1-4), the 
SAF framework moves beyond conventional in-
stitutional logics-based analysis focused on 
shared understandings between institutions 
and organizations in fields, and, for a start-
point, sees SAFs as always ripe for contestation 
and dynamic. SAFs contain actors and institu-
tions (players) that constantly jockey for posi-
tion, or will do if given the chance. Players 
(stakeholders, etc.) that are constantly moni-
toring each other and considering their own 
position and advantage try to secure advantage 
or protect their positions and other players 
have to interpret them, consider their options, 
and react in response. Less and more powerful 
players make constant adjustments given their 
positions and the actions of others, and less 
powerful players may take any number of ac-
tions to try to even marginally improve their 
positions in the field (i.e. the SAF).23
Using these basic parameters, the SAF 
framework deals with the dynamism of policy 
change. It stresses the importance of under-
standing the origins and emergence of the for-
mation of the field to understanding the role of 
agency in the field, of power, and conflict, in-
terests and resources, or positions of players 
and their behaviors relative to each other, so 
that player behavior is not solely path depen-
dent, and can be conditioned by a plethora of 
modalities and interrelationships both internal 
and external to the SAF. Additionally, the 
framework allows for the fact that decisions in 
one layer of the decision tree may affect other 
layers, and that they also cause reactions in the 
other layers, which then cause further reac-
tions. Then, player behavior turns on sets of 
understandings fashioned over time by mem-
bers of the field that are shared, sometimes 
conflicted, and sometimes consensual relation-
ships within the SAF. This principle can be 
extended to other SAFs so that SAFs are 
linked. The importance of interdependence be-
tween players in a SAF, and between SAFs, 
cannot be overstated.24
Then, the theory is composed of seven ele-
ments that serve as a framework for under-
Figure 2: Japan’s Eight-Layer Analytical Model  
for Space Policy Transition
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standing how players behave and respond to 
changes and challenges to any given status quo 
position within a SAF, and then between SAFs. 
Those elements are: 1. The SAFs themselves, 
which act as the arenas in which power strug-
gles take place (or don’t); 2. The players (actors/
stakeholders); 3. The “social skill” or parame-
ters for action, motivations and abilities of the 
stakeholders to act; 4. The “broader field envi-
ronment,” i.e. broader externalities that may 
affect the behavior of stakeholders in a particu-
lar SAF or SAFs; 5. The role of exogenous 
shocks, and what the author calls “the onset of 
contention,” or changes external (or, indeed, in-
ternal) to a SAF or SAFs that can cause change 
within it and in other related SAFs; 6. “Epi-
sodes of contention,” in other words, power 
struggles, and; 7. “Settlement,” or the reshuf-
fling of power arrangements within a particu-
lar SAF and/or related SAFs.
Figure 3: The Lives of SAFs
The players
Within static or dynamic SAFs, player be-
havior and social skill can be understood 
through a rational actor behavioral analysis-
motivational matrix model. Players are embed-
ded in a division of labor (as are, to a degree, 
SAFs) and share a collective understanding of 
their positions and objectives, what is at stake, 
and the positions of other players and rules 
(both formal an informal) about what tactics 
are possible, legitimate, and interpretable. 
When a SAF is settled, there is a consensus 
about the parameters of actions among players, 
but those players may not view the division of 
spoils in the field as legitimate. 
In SAF theory, there are three types of 
players: incumbents, challengers, and gover-
nance unit players. Incumbents rule the roost, 
and dominate the frame of competition. Chal-
lengers wield little influence, but, recognizing 
the dominant logic of incumbent players, artic-
ulate an alternative vision, while outwardly at 
least conforming to the prevailing order. Gov-
ernance units tend to uphold the prevailing or-
der. Overall, the prevailing norms of the system 
within the field that competing organizations 
operate in govern the parameters of both in-
cumbents and challengers.25 The utility of this 
model when studying the behavior of institu-
tions (for example, a ministry, etc.,) is that the 
SAF framework holistically takes into account 
the expected behaviors of clusters of interrelat-
ed players to given inputs, but that it also sees 
these relationships as dynamic over time, rath-
er than static or one-shot deals. There is often 
jockeying for position between players in a field 
as a result of their contested nature. Under cer-
tain circumstances, then, there is, subsequent-
ly, jockeying between fields. 
The fields (SAFs)
Further, SAFs can be arrayed along a con-
tinuum between SAFs that may appear settled, 
but may contain widespread dissent and con-
f lict, or the potential for such, within them. 
Disruption in (even one part of) one SAF can 
then impact closer or even more distant SAFs. 
If there are outside disruptions to the field, or if 
the relative power of players changes, jockeying 
for advantage may occur. Conflict can break 
out, and the very structure of the SAF may be 
up for grabs, so that it is possible for a whole 
new order to appear with a redefinition of the 
positions of the players, the rules of the game, 
and the overriding ends of the SAF. The SAF 
framework, then, seeks to understand how or-
der was established, and how stability is con-
tested; and how SAFs journey from formation 
to stability, through contention, and onto (par-
tial/contested/temporary) settlement. Thus, 
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SAFs are expected to exist in a state of flux, as 
the process of contention is often (usually) on-
going and threats to the current order are al-
ways present to some degree.
Figure 5: Adapted SAF for Japan Space Policy and 
Institutional Change
Source: Author’s own schema of an operational SAF, 
adapted from Fligstein & McAdam (2012).
Strategic action
In their original theory, Fligstein and Mc-
Adam took a sociological ontological approach 
to explaining the role of players in social life, 
resting on cultural factors, and focusing on mo-
tivations, winners, and losers. For analytical 
simplicity, the adapted SAF framework used in 
this paper calls concerted (impactful) behavior, 
or a series of actions by a particular player or 
players to affect changes in the SAF as innova-
tive and/or strategic action. 
Strategic action might be a bid by one play-
er to change the behavior of other players in a 
particular SAF, or to try to take control of an 
SAF, or, for example, to forestall the loss of con-
trol against a threat, and so on. Innovative ac-
tion is generally understood here as an at-
tempted precursor to attempted strategic 
action, something akin to nemawashi (prepar-
ing the groundwork, setting out the stall, gath-
ering allies and developing the means) to try to 
exert more profound or impactful change, i.e. 
leading to, or preparing for, strategic action. 
Then, players that undertake strategic action 
must be able to use whatever tactics they have 
developed in a sufficiently intersubjective fash-
ion to secure the cooperation of other players. 
This kind of skill enables players to transcend 
their own individual and narrow group inter-
ests as a prerequisite for shaping a broader 
conception of the collective.26
Structural linkage: The broader field environ-
ment
Moving to a higher level of analysis beyond 
institutional logics-constructivist frameworks, 
SAF theory stresses the importance of linking, 
embodying the SAF or SAFs in broader matri-
ces of relationships with other SAFs. Thus, the 
broader environment within which any given 
SAF is embedded, for example, an external se-
curity issue like a missile launch, or a slow 
burner issue interpreted as a potential security 
dilemma, or an interfering politician, or a sud-
den change in public opinion, can all play im-
portant roles in SAF dynamics.27 Then, in our 
adapted model, the international security situ-
ation and the U.S.-Japan alliance framework of 
diplomacy and negotiations can be seen as each 
forming their own SAFs with their own play-
ers. Further, the bureaucratic layer and indi-
vidual bureaucracies can be seen as their own 
SAFs. 
As with Fligstein and McAdam, we view 
the State as an SAF itself in which Japan’s cen-
tral ministries can play certain roles as SAF 
players, and as a collection of players. As an 
SAF, Japan’s powerful bureaucracy might well 
be predicated play a de facto role as an internal 
governance unit that balances the powers of 
politicians (in the U.S. constitutional gover-
nance framework as one of the checks and bal-
ances, etc.) Of course, under different circum-
stances, SAFs within the bureaucracy can act 
as incumbents, challengers or internal gover-
nance units, depending on the situation, espe-
cially, for example, when there is contestation 
within the bureaucratic SAF. In this study, this 
scenario, often seen in inter-ministry rivalry, is 
exactly what happened.
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Exogenous shocks, mobilization, and the on-
set of contention
Pressure or change can cause reactions 
that ripple into (on, through) other intercon-
nected SAFs. Often, shocks will be absorbed: 
challengers may feel the incumbents are too 
secure; incumbents can count on the support of 
loyal allies within internal governance units 
both internal to the SAF and have allies em-
bedded in proximate State and nonstate fields 
to support them. Mobilization in this model can 
be cast into a similar role to innovative action, 
leading to the onset of contention, with players 
acting according to the rules of the road laid 
out above.28 Contention can be defined as “a pe-
riod of emergent, sustained contentious inter-
action between … [field] actors utilizing new 
and innovative forms of action vis-à-vis one an-
other.” Besides innovative action, episodes of 
contention occur when players share a sense of 
uncertainty/crisis regarding the rules and pow-
er relations governing the SAF. In stable SAFs, 
with well-established incumbents and chal-
lengers, the mobilization of both groups can be 
intense and sustained, and an episode of con-
tention can last as long as the shared sense of 
uncertainty regarding the structure and domi-
nant order of the SAF persists.29
Settlement
Then, finally, in line with classic institu-
tional theories that assert that bureaucracies 
and organizations tend toward stasis and the 
reinstitution or reestablishment of familiar 
patterns of interactions and relationships, the 
SAF framework also states that SAFs in epi-
sodes of contention also contain elements, or 
that SAFs always have internal mechanisms, 
that will eventually restore order or allow ac-
tors to come to a new equilibrium, or settle-
ment. Even the most violently boiled liquid will 
cool and settle once the heat energy supplied to 
it is stopped: incumbents will try to sublimate 
or absorb the shocks of the episodes of conten-
tion and successful challengers, executing a 
change, will then try to re-impose order on the 
SAF. 
Often, the advantage enjoyed by incum-
bents may be enough to overcome crisis and re-
store order. More rarely, challengers success-
fully sustain mobilization and slowly begin to 
institutionalize new practices and rules, or new 
structures. However most players have a stake 
in restoring the shared sense of order that will 
eventually lead to compromises and the reas-
sertion of order, or a new status quo: no player 
wants to risk systemic breakdown or inefficien-
cies that make governance more difficult, af-
fecting the status or ability to act or govern in 
the system as a whole.30
Applying the SAF framework to Japanese 
space policy and institutional change
Before we apply the SAF framework to 
Japanese space policy transition, a brief con-
textual background to the subject at hand is 
necessary. Our analysis comes at the end of a 
period lasting 2009-12 which had seen on-off 
political pressure to implement the Basic Law 
amid bureaucratic resistance to change, which 
boiled down to a struggle for power between the 
politically-led attempt to assert CO control over 
policy and budgeting from the incumbent pow-
er of MEXT, which, by 2008 controlled and had 
oversight of more than 60% of the annual space 
budget, in order to implement the Basic Law. 
To assert CO control over MEXT, in 2012 the 
Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP), 
a small coordinating office in the CO tasked 
with pushing the implementation of the Basic 
Law, succeeded in establishing the ONSP and 
the SPC along the lines of Figure 1 above, after 
the Diet passed the “Partial Revision of the 
Cabinet Office Establishment Act.” The Act also 
scrapped Article 4 of the JAXA Law, which still 
committed JAXA to peaceful purposes-only 
space development (a legal obstacle not tackled 
by the original Basic Law). This allowed JAXA 
and MEXT to participate for the first time in 
42
non-offensive military space development.31
However, as is implied in Figure 1, the 
ONSP’s establishment came only after multi-
year negotiations with MEXT, which resisted 
loss of control of its budget to the CO and would 
only allow partial input on policymaking and 
control from non-MEXT ministers and bodies. 
The result of this partial settlement was that, 
apart from creating the ONSP, the legislation 
established the SPC as reporting directly to the 
prime minister to provide policy, program pri-
oritization, and budgeting recommendations 
within the CO, but it failed to gain direct con-
trol over MEXT in terms of space program bud-
geting.
Our detailed analysis starts in December 
2013 following the rejection of Basic Plan 2’s at-
tempt to secure funding for a massive (nine 
satellite) constellation of Earth and ocean 
(MDA) observation satellites (hereafter called 
the Wide Area EO, or WAEO constellation) 
drawn up by the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
try (METI), which had attempted to take over 
the ONSP and bend space policy to its own pro-
grams. METI, stuffing the ONSP with its own 
staffers, tried to bypass the SPC, which was le-
gally mandated to neutrally arbitrate policy, 
and ram the budget for WAEO through the 
Ministry of Finance. Insufficient consultation 
provoked the MOD to join MEXT in opposing 
the plan. The failure to coordinate the WAEO 
came at a critical time, just after Prime Minis-
ter Abe, who had just established the NSC and 
NSS, demanded clearer and decisive decision-
making. The NSS put enormous policy pres-
sure on the ONSP, and can be seen as the mid-
wife of Basic Plan 2016.32
Using an adapted form of the SAF frame-
work, this paper now traces the story from 
2013-16 through the interdependent linkages 
and levels of relationships ranging from the in-
ternational situation down to the grass roots 
(jobs, contracts, cash) that factored into the 
timing and contents of Basic Plan 2016. To do 
this, we need to, at least: 1. Establish the SAF 
and sub-SAFs; 2. Establish the players and 
their motivations, and 3. Establish the relation-
ships between the players and the SAFs.
Formulation of the general space activi-
ties SAF
As implied, the task of this section looking 
at field formation is to establish the players, 
their motivational matrices, incumbents and 
challengers, and internal governance units, 
and identify sources of contention as well as the 
shock(s) or externalities that force change. 
Figure 6: Overall Space SAF
This SAF shows the settlement phase of 
what we might call the general space activities 
SAF, which equates to the current situation be-
tween all the players. The remaining part of 
this paper will use an SAF framework-based 
analysis to show how Basic Plan 2016 repre-
sents the settlement of a series of entirely logi-
cal outcomes between players, including be-
tween the incumbent MEXT and challenger 
SAFs, through the processes of shock, mobiliza-
tion, innovative and strategic action, episodes 
of contention, and settlement. 
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Figure 7: SAF 1 Regional Security Situation
SAF 1: Can be characterized as being mainly 
dealing with security pressures felt by Japan, 
including nuclear and missile tests by North 
Korea and increased tensions with the PRC.
Figure 8: SAF 2 Inter-State Diplomatic  
(Level 2: Inter-State)
SAF 2: The U.S. had been requesting that Ja-
pan coordinate its space policy with U.S. strat-
egy, and following the June 2011 Japan-U.S. 
Security Consultative Committee (2+2), space 
policy coordination started to become a key al-
liance agenda item, at least for the U.S., with 
the U.S. in particular requesting Japan to im-
prove its SSA contribution and work on an 
MDA solution with the U.S. In 2011 the U.S. 
and Japan agreed to prioritize QZSS develop-
ment, SSA, and MDA, which was further ce-
mented by the March 2013 1st Comprehensive 
Dialogue on Space, the May 2013 Exchange of 
Notes concerning SSA Services, and the 2+2 of 
October 2013.33
Figure 9: SAF 3 Domestic Political 1
SAF 3: While the U.S. did add pressure 
through negotiations after 2010 for Japan to 
paramilitarize its space program, a strong plu-
rality of the Diet supported the enactment of 
the Basic Law of 2008, which was passed by the 
vast majority of Diet members, including many 
socialists and Kōmeitō politicians (notionally 
committed to pacifism). During the 2008-2009 
period, the LDP had quickly set up the SHSP 
within the CO under strong political leadership 
of senior LDP politicians to push the reforms 
through and establish CO control over MEXT 
and JAXA. While the critical objective of the 
Basic Law was to establish CO control over 
space policy, the primary goals of Basic Plan 1 
as drawn up by the SHSP were to get the QZSS 
and MDA constellations funded. However con-
crete planning for Basic Plan 1 was opposed by 
MEXT, which feared its own position, and 
which stalled until, as expected, the LDP was 
temporarily thrown out of power in 2009. 
The advent of the Democratic Party of Ja-
pan (DPJ) in 2009 saw an even more radical 
effort to break up JAXA and MEXT control and 
institute an Uchūchō (space agency) within the 
CO. The move had been instigated by activist 
State Minister for Space Development (and de-
fense hawk) Seiji Maehara, who attempted to 
bypass the SHSP by establishing a private 
(guerilla) committee of politically appointed re-
form-minded experts. This, a subset of the 
DPJ’s manifesto rhetoric and its deeper politi-
cal goal to wrest policymaking power away 
from the bureaucracy provoked deep resistance 
in the entire bureaucratic layer, not least with-
in the SHSP itself. As it turned out, elements 
in the SHSP and MEXT combined to stall the 
plans until a negotiated settlement to set up 
the ONSP and permit it control of the QZSS 
constellation was allowed by MEXT.
Figure 10: SAF 4 Political-Bureaucratic- 
Subgovernment Nexus
North Korea Nuclear and Missile Tests
PRC Counterspace Activities and Maritime Expansionism
Mounting U.S. pressure on Japan to integrate its space program 
with U.S. containment strategy for North Korea and PRC
Plurality of Politicians except MEXT Minister and some 
socialists and communists want to enact the Basic Law
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In April 2010, Maehara installed a guerilla 
committee that, through a series of innovative 
and strategic actions, including setting up in-
ternal committees stuffed with sympathizers, 
gradually gained enough personnel to force a 
compromise forming the ONSP, which would 
take control of the QZSS program, leaving oth-
er elements of the implementation of the Basic 
Law up for grabs. Following the establishment 
of the ONSP, METI then attempted to grab 
control of the ONSP through a METI-appointed 
Director General (Junya Nishimoto), which pri-
oritized METI space programs over the incum-
bent MEXT. This resulted in Basic Plan 2, 
which promoted industrialization and national 
security combined with using its MDA-Earth 
Observation constellation (which developed into 
WAEO constellation proposal). This brought 
METI into a direct confrontation with MEXT, 
which strongly resisted any attempt by METI 
to gain power or influence.
METI achieved the writing of Basic Plan 2 
(though not the budgeting of WAEO) through 
packing the ONSP with its staff and its sup-
porters in various key ONSP subcommittees.34 
Industrialization and national security space 
were at the core of policy. Fieldwork with ONSP 
officials at this time confirmed the METI fla-
vor of the ONSP. In interviews conducted during 
these developments, METI officials were openly 
and frankly highly dismissive of both JAXA 
and MEXT’s position and framed the Basic 
Plan as a “last chance” to invest strategically 
in industry, primarily through QZSS and 
WAEO.35
This period also saw the MOD begin to 
populate the ONSP, an historic change for Jap-
anese space policy and administration. The 
foundation of the ONSP gave the MOD several 
options: It could try to more directly work with 
JAXA for major new military space programs; 
if it wished, it could join the MIC and METI 
ministers, for example, to assert “dual control” 
over JAXA and use it as a tool to develop new 
research or development programs; it could also 
use JAXA expertize to assess programs it 
seeks to research or develop “in house.” Anoth-
er option for the MOD would be to directly work 
with favored contractors, employing JAXA in a 
technical and advisory/ consultative role. How-
ever, the MOD’s main strategy was to forge 
connections with JAXA to learn how the two 
very different organizations, with completely 
different cultures and approaches, could work 
together, while the MOD spent a minimal bud-
get and focused on researching technologies. 
The MOD’s logical strategy, then, was to piggy-
back off the new institutional and policy struc-
tures, i.e., specifically to make sure another 
ministry paid, ref lecting the MOD’s arms-
length stance.36 In addition, for the MOD exclu-
sively, Basic Plan 2 did help produce budget for 
dedicated, hardened and modern communica-
tions satellites with improved bandwidth and 
encryption, ending the JSDF’s 30-year rela-
tionship of leasing commercial transponders; 
and of course, the MOD supported QZSS for 
obvious reasons.37
Episode of contention: Failure of METI to 
coordinate WAEO
The MOD would also be a primary custom-
er for the emerging constellation, for example, 
if coordination could be achieved; and the MOD 
would cooperate on SSA. However, unsurpris-
ingly, the ONSP’s internal coordination failed. 
The ONSP held dozens of meetings in the ar-
rangements leading up to the budget request 
for Basic Plan 2 in which the MOD participat-
ed, but MOD never wavered from its two main 
priorities; improved ISR and communication as 
first priority, while supporting the ONSP in its 
attempts to control the QZSS system, which 
would be highly beneficial for the MOD. As the 
METI-proposed WAEO constellation advanced 
though, the MOD joined MEXT in expressing 
its own frustrations with the project, which, 
from the points of view of both MEXT and 
MOD, seemed more designed to service METI’s 
needs than those of the MOD. Thus, institu-
tional competition and stovepiping acted as a 
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major brake on policy advancement. 
The inability of the METI-led SHSP to con-
trol a budget line for the WAEO constellation 
was to be a disaster for Nishimoto. Crucially, 
the proposal bypassed coordination in the SPC, 
which reported directly to Prime Minister Abe, 
abrogating the SPC’s coordination skills, ex-
pertise, and both the personal and professional 
relationships necessary to smooth the way. The 
uncoordinated WAEO proposal was also op-
posed, unsurprisingly, by MEXT, which felt 
sidelined in the massive new program. A recal-
ibrated proposal then connected the constella-
tion to the IGS, but this was rejected as being 
too METI-centric. The MOD also felt that, as a 
customer ministry, it had not been fully con-
sulted and that the solution proposed by ONSP 
advanced METI’s agenda but did not fulfill the 
MOD’s needs. The MOD’s rejection of the ME-
TI-backed ONSP proposal in the fall of 2013 
proved decisive, giving the MOF the excuse to 
reject the WAEO constellation as poorly coordi-
nated. The MOF duly reduced the WAEO con-
stellation to an R&D project at a tenth of the 
budget requested.38
The failure to coordinate the WAEO con-
stellation budget was repeated in Japan’s ap-
proach to SSA, despite this becoming a major 
priority for the U.S. Again, the MOD kept its 
distance from ONSP and JAXA, which was 
committed to a maintaining a civilian-led ap-
proach and protecting its prerogative. This re-
luctance was reflected internally where there 
were apparent divisions between the ASDF, the 
Defense Policy Division and the new, small 
Space Policy Group, which did not regard SSA 
as a priority. In fact, the MOD decided to play a 
multi-level game with SSA, where it was offi-
cially in favor of SSA being promoted, but in 
fact this public stance masked its real position 
of wanting to be a beneficiary of SSA but not 
wanting to pay for it, i.e. not requesting a bud-
get for it out of its own budget lines, which 
would have meant cuts to other budgets.39
Figure 11: The Attempted Takeover of the ONSP  
by METI
These failures, however came at just, ex-
actly, the wrong moment for METI — in fact 
just as the second Abe administration had de-
veloped the new NSS in December 2013, which 
had mandated that the ONSP produce a fully 
coordinated space policy that was integrated 
with the new national strategy. The failure also 
had a profound effect on the credibility of the 
ONSP in the eyes of the LDP as it came just as 
Japan formulated its first NSS. The lack of de-
cisive leadership and beggar-thy-neighbor in-
terministerial competition over the WAEO con-
stellation showed that the ONSP had failed in 
its primary responsibility of delivering an MDA 
program. While the ONSP’s failure to coordi-
nate WAEO could not have come at a worse 
time in terms of domestic policy-making, it was 
also ill-starred in terms of alliance politics, be-
cause it represented a poor outcome for U.S.-
Japan cooperation.
Figure 12: SAF 5 Industry Stakeholders
Fieldwork conducted with industry shows 
that it was highly satisfied with Basic Plan 2.9
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Figure 13: SAF 6  Public Opinion
It is possible to see public opinion as a re-
cessed governance unit. 
From Basic Plan 2 to Basic Plan 2016
In the U.S.-Japan cooperation SAF, the 
year 2013 saw increasing coordination and co-
operation between Japan and the U.S. on outer 
space matters. Perhaps at Levels 2 and 3 this 
should not be seen so much as alliance pressure 
on Japan because the Abe administration was a 
willing partner. Thus 2013 saw Japan and the 
U.S. negotiate a third major policy statement, 
the Joint Statement by the U.S.-Japan Compre-
hensive Dialogue on Space of 11 March 2013, 
apparently dovetailing with the Basic Plan 2’s 
reformulation of Basic Plan 1 into a more dual-
use national security direction. This was 
followed by the June 4 Strategic Budgeting 
Plan for 2014 by the ONSP which provided the 
ONSP’s policy response to the March agree-
ment. The significance of QZSS has been noted 
as the prime deliverable desired by the Basic 
Law, but behind this, many in the security and 
the space community in Japan agreed with the 
U.S. over the growing need to improve MDA 
and SSA. The need to improve SSA capabilities 
for all satellites, not least Japan’s commercial 
communications services and EO programs 
had been highlighted earlier.40
On top of this, specifically, after 2010, 
MDA was seen as a major security concern of 
Japan following the marked upswing in specific 
Japan-PRC tensions focused on the Senkaku 
islets dispute, which worsened in 2010 follow-
ing a collision between a Chinese fishing trawl-
er and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel, and the 
onslaught of gray-zone warfare and massed in-
cursions by Chinese trawlers and coast guard 
vessels that continue today. MDA, along with 
SSA, became one of two major new space-based 
security-bolstering measures agreed by Japan 
and the U.S. resulting in the Joint Statement 
by the U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialogue on 
Space on 11 March 2013, in which both sides 
agreed to bolster cooperation in SSA, QZSS 
and MDA.
Strategic action: The Imazu intervention
The failure of the ONSP to deliver MDA 
incensed senior LPD security leadership and 
provoked the Chairman of the LDP Policy Re-
search Council’s Research Commission on Se-
curity and former JDA Director Hiroshi Imazu 
to initiate strategic action. Imazu launched a 
special investigation into space policy reform 
through the vehicle of the Special Committee 
for Space and Ocean Development (SDSS), 
which, over a series of ten meetings, published 
an initial (mid-term) “Recommendations for a 
Comprehensive Space Strategy to Implement 
Japan’s National Strategy” (hereafter, the 
Strategy) on 5 June 2014.41
The Strategy recommended that Japan: 1. 
Japan establish an Uchūchō with the authority 
to request budget for all line ministries within 
three years; 2. Establish a Japanese version of 
the U.S. military’s National Security Space 
Strategy in close coordination with the newly-
formed NSC and NSS; 3. Deploy SSA and MDA 
satellite constellations as quickly as possible; 4. 
Bolster IGS as quickly as possible; 5. Begin re-
search immediately on new direct military 
(MOD) usage of image intelligence (reconnais-
sance), SIGINT and a space-based EW capabil-
ity; 6. Seamlessly integrate all these technolo-
gies and assets with those of the U.S.; 7. 
Militarize the use of the Epsilon rocket for rap-
id launching of small military satellites; 8. 
Harden JAXA facilities against attack; 9. 
Transform JAXA into a U.S. DARPA-type role, 
and; 10. Create a space security think tank to 
conduct future strategizing and policy plan-
ning. 
The Strategy dusted off the Maehara-era 
Uchūchō  option as a kind of sledgehammer 
threat as the only way to induce the ONSP to 
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deliver the desired policy change. Yet, when the 
SDSS released its final report in August, there 
were two significant alterations. First, the in-
sistence that the CO be given budget authority 
was deleted, but that this should be considered. 
Second, the final Strategy specifically stated 
that the IGS constellation be more than dou-
bled to ten satellites from four. What had hap-
pened?
Strategic action: The ONSP
Simply, the pressure worked, because the 
ONSP working publicly, created a response 
that satisfied the LDP and prevented, from the 
point of view of the bureaucracy, the LDP 
pressing its deliberately provocative and radi-
cal proposals. Eighteen days after the second, 
“watered down” version of the Strategy was 
published, the ONSP convened a Fundamental 
Strategy Committee (FSC) to coordinate the 
ONSP’s response in what became Basic Plan 3 
— that was to be drawn up no later than De-
cember, so that the plan be budgeted for the 
following April. The FSC immediately deliv-
ered its own updated medium-term space poli-
cy, the “Fundamental Policy Committee Mid-
Term Summary” (MTS), on only its second 
meeting, on 20 August, 2014. A week later, the 
ONSP delivered its budget request for 2015 for-
mally requesting the MOF for funding of the 
implementation of the MTS.
The MTS mostly seemed to achieve what 
had been demanded by the LDP. In fact, the 
MTS is probably historic in terms of Japanese 
space policy documents because it is the first to 
directly endorse national security clearly and 
explicitly as the fundamental first priority of 
Japanese space activities, a critical change in 
semantics signaling a deeper policy shift, and 
whose language was repeated in Basic Policy 
2016. While essentially a mediated (diluted) 
version of the Strategy, the MTS nonetheless 
reads like a defense strategy policy document. 
The opening paragraphs could very well have 
been lifted directly out of the NSS, for example, 
by clearly putting MDA as the top agenda item. 
Superseding prior statements, the MTS direct-
ly stated that Japan’s space policy founded on 
the Basic Law scraps science and technology 
and substitutes industrialization and national 
security as the main goals.
Primarily, it denoted a fundamentally 
changed recognition of the role of Japanese 
space policy in that: space development and 
technology should play an essential role na-
tional security; that the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
had reached a ‘New Era’ (almost directly bor-
rowing the terminology from the LDP), and 
that space technology was a critical component 
for the U.S. to deter aggression and help its 
power projection in the Asia-Pacific Region; 
that should the U.S.’s space-based capabilities 
be eroded or degraded Japan must be in a posi-
tion to support the U.S., and; that it was essen-
tial that that space policy support long-term 
investment in space development. Specifically, 
the MTS stated that the full seven-satellite 
QZSS system be built as quickly as possible; 
that the IGS constellation be improved and the 
new data load handled by an improved commu-
nications infrastructure, including an orbital 
data relay system; and that Japan develop a 
new capstone rocket program focused on fast 
responsiveness and from hardened facilities. In 
terms of utilization, the MTS urged that na-
tional security-related programs were top pri-
ority, focusing on SSA, MDA, communications, 
space-based BMDEW, and rapid response.
Settlement
With a strong mandate from Prime Min-
ster Abe himself to draw up a new Basic Plan 
(Basic Plan 3) in December in time for the fol-
lowing year’s budget preparations, the ONSP 
went to work. The resulting Basic Plan 3 as 
shown in Table 1 clearly seemed to endorse the 
new national security-first direction: that Ja-
pan must actively develop a national security 
space program with the military use of space in 
tune with the new NSS, and, for the first time, 
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the MOD was to be directly involved in a bud-
get mission development program under the 
general space activities budget in the form of 
its experimental EW sensor on a newly devel-
oped JAXA-built satellite. Once the principal 
framework for the paramilitarization Japan’s 
space program was achieved in Basic Plan 3, 
Basic Plan 2016 and subsequent iterations be-
came budget vehicles for implementation.
Conclusion
The above analysis of Basic Plan 2016 indi-
cates that it represents a significant departure 
from previous policy that had prevented Japa-
nese actors from any involvement in national 
security. The policy is also shown to be the re-
sult of a long-drawn-out process of navigating 
complex interrelationships between external 
security threats, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and 
internal policymaking, involving intensive and 
interrelated behaviors by Japanese actors and 
constituencies. The paper used an adaption of 
the Theory of Fields, called the SAF frame-
work, to avoid top-down models involving tradi-
tional macrotheoretical analytical and micro-
analytical approaches and, focusing on the 
critical period 2013-2016, employed SAFs to 
uncover the logics of and provide new insights 
into the behaviors of actors involved in the 
transition of policy.
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Sōgō Senryaku Shōiinkai, Uchū · Kaiyō Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Iinkai “Kokka Anzen Hosho Uchū Senryaku — 
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